TO CATCH A WILDLIFE THIEF:
STRATEGIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FIGHT
AGAINST ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING
Marcus A. Asner*
I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................1
II. A TYPICAL INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING
SCHEME—UNITED STATES V. BENGIS ..........................................4
A. The Supply Side ....................................................................5
B. The Demand Side .................................................................6
C. The Money Flow ..................................................................7
III. INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING A WILDLIFE
TRAFFICKING RING ................................................................... 8
A. How Do We Catch the Bad Guys? .......................................8
B. The Prosecutions................................................................11
IV. SOME TAKEAWAYS AND THOUGHTS FOR REFORM ...................14
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................19

I.

INTRODUCTION

Wildlife trafficking is very much in the headline news these
days. Booming demand for wildlife products such as ivory and
rhino horn—especially in Asia—coupled with uneven enforcement
and porous border controls has fueled a big uptick in the illegal
wildlife trade.1 In recent years, trafficking rings have morphed from
small-time gangs into sophisticated and well-organized criminal
organizations, borrowing many of the tactics we’ve come to expect
* The author is a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and served on the President’s
Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking from 2013 to 2016. I would like to thank
Katherine Ghilain, Daniel W. Levy and Lisa Handy for their helpful insights and
comments.
1 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING (2014) [hereinafter NATIONAL
STRATEGY].
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from the narcotics cartels.2 The increase in wildlife trafficking has
had a devastating impact, with a number of species, including
elephants and rhinoceroses, facing the risk of significant decline or
even extinction.3 As President Obama’s Task Force on Combatting
Wildlife Trafficking has explained:
Wildlife trafficking threatens an increasing variety of
terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species, including
but not limited to: elephants, rhinos, tigers, sharks,
tuna, sea turtles, land tortoises, great apes, exotic
birds, pangolins, sturgeon, coral, iguanas,
chameleons, and tarantulas. Wildlife trafficking is
facilitated and exacerbated by illegal harvest and
trade in plants and trees, which destroys needed
habitat and opens access to previously remote
populations of highly endangered wildlife, such as
tigers. In addition, illegal trafficking of fisheries
products, among others, threatens food supplies and
food security. Many species decimated by illegal
trade and other threats, such as habitat loss, are now
in danger of extinction.
Wildlife trafficking
jeopardizes the survival of iconic species such as
elephants and rhinos.4

2 See id.; see also Bryan Christy, Tracking Ivory, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 12,
2015), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html, archived at
https://perma.cc/RB9N-M3RT (investigating links between ivory trafficking and funding
for the Lord’s Resistance Army); Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Before the S. Armed Services Comm.,
114th Cong. 11-12, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_0209-16.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z2DQ-SBCS (2016) (statement of James R.
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence) (“Organized crime and rebel groups in Africa
and elsewhere are likely to increase their involvement in wildlife trafficking to fund
political activities, enhance political influence, and purchase weapons. Illicit trade in
wildlife, timber, and marine resources endangers the environment, threatens good
governance and border security in fragile regions, and destabilizes communities whose
economic well-being depends on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism. Increased
demand for ivory and rhino horn in East Asia has triggered unprecedented increases in
poaching in Sub-Saharan Africa.”).
3 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 4.
4 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 4.
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Much of the battle against trafficking appropriately has
focused on reducing demand by raising public awareness. 5 The
United States and a number of other countries have organized
highly publicized ivory “crushes,” destroying confiscated ivory in
part to educate consumers about the poaching crisis and in part as an
effort to dry up the market for ivory. 6 Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have been busy raising public awareness
through advertising, much of it focused on curbing demand in the
Asian market.7
This article focuses on the enforcement side of the fight
against the illegal wildlife trade. Drawing on a case I handled as a
federal prosecutor in Manhattan—United States v. Bengis 8 —the
article explores how a typical international wildlife trafficking
scheme may work in practice. By understanding how wildlife
trafficking actually works—how a ring must work in many
instances—we will be in a better position to know where traffickers
necessarily must leave evidence. With such an understanding, law
enforcement agents and prosecutors will be in a better position to
gather the evidence they need to prove the case. And legislators and
policymakers will be able to craft laws and enforcement policies
that will help ensure that the full force of criminal law is employed
in the fight against wildlife trafficking.
Part I of this article provides a brief, high-level overview of
the Bengis scheme, examining some of the methods the ring used in
its decade-long fish trafficking scheme and focusing on where the
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING, 2015 ANNUAL PROGRESS ASSESSMENT
(2015), at 20–23 (summarizing U.S. efforts to reduce demand).
6 The U.S. Ivory Crush at Times Square, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
https://www.fws.gov/le/elephant-ivory-crush.html, archived at https://perma.cc/9Z8LH8FK (last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
7 See, e.g., Ivory Demand Reduction Campaign Launched in China, AFRICAN
WILDLIFE FOUNDATION (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.awf.org/news/ivory-demand-reduc
tion-campaign-launched-china, archived at https://perma.cc/D8WD-22BP. China recently
announced that it would ban commerce in ivory by the end of 2017. See, e.g., Edward
wong & Jeffrey Gettleman, China Bans Its Ivory Trade, Moving Against Elephant
Poaching,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/world/asia/china-ivory-ban-elephants.html?_r=0,
archived at https://perma.cc/MB4N-KXLP.
8 United States v. Bengis, 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The district court
documents referenced herein are publicly available, and many of them may be found on
PACER. Where possible, the docket number for particular filings is indicated with the
citation.
5
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co-conspirators had to leave behind the evidence that law
enforcement later would use to catch them. Part II focuses on the
investigation and prosecutions of the ring in South Africa and in the
United States, highlighting how the evidence that the ring members
necessarily left behind ultimately was used to disrupt their criminal
organization and bring them to justice. Finally, Part III provides
some lessons learned from the Bengis prosecution to highlight some
of the challenges law enforcement faces in investigating and
prosecuting wildlife trafficking. It also offers several reform
proposals that legislators and policymakers (both in the United
States and abroad) might consider in their efforts to bolster the legal
landscape, with an eye toward giving prosecutors and agents better
tools in the fight against traffickers.

II.

A TYPICAL INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING
SCHEME—UNITED STATES V. BENGIS

From at least 1987 through approximately August 2001,
Arnold Bengis headed a ring of co-conspirators engaged in an
elaborate scheme to illegally harvest massive quantities of South
African rock lobster and Patagonian toothfish and then export the
illegal seafood to the United States, where they sold it for a
significant profit.9 As part of the scheme, the Bengis organization
routinely would harvest and purchase rock lobster far in excess of
applicable quotas. A report prepared by Ocean and Land Resource
Assessment Consultants (OLRAC) estimated, conservatively, that
the ring illegally harvested approximately 856 metric tons of South

9 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that South Africa
suffered direct harm from Bengis’ scheme to illegally harvest lobsters, and therefore is a
victim for restitution purposes); see also Indictment at 6-8, 23-28, United States v. Bengis,
S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003), ECF No. 201-1 [hereinafter Indictment] (laying out
the Grand Jury charges to defendant Bengis’ and co-defendants’ conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act and commit smuggling); Brief for the United States of America at 4-6, United
States v. Bengis, 07-4895-cr (2d Cir. May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Gov’t Appeal Bf.]
(providing the statement of facts for the defendants’ offensive conduct); Government’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for a Departure from the
Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range at 7-9, United States v. Bengis, No. 1:03-cr00308-LAK (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2004), ECF 195-28 [hereinafter Gov’t Sentencing
Mem.] (elaborating on the defendants’ criminal scheme to illegally import into the United
States large quantities of South African rock lobster, as well as Patagonian toothfish).
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Coast rock lobster during the course of the scheme, 10 which
significantly depleted the South Coast rock lobster resource.11 One
co-conspirator, who ended up cooperating with the investigation,
reported that the ring also bought large quantities of illegally
harvested West Coast rock lobster from local fishermen throughout
the duration of the conspiracy—estimating that, in the final year of
the scheme, approximately 93% of the West Coast rock lobster the
ring handled had been illegally harvested. 12 By OLRAC’s
conservative estimate, the ring caused damages of between $46.7
million and $61.9 million to South Africa’s rock lobster resource.13
A. The Supply Side
Any illicit trafficking operation—whether it involves
wildlife, narcotics, blood diamonds, guns or even counterfeit
goods—involves a supply side, a demand side, and a flow of money.
The supply side of the Bengis scheme was centered in Cape Town,
South Africa, where the ring operated a fish-processing plant
(known as Hout Bay Fishing Industries (PTY) Ltd), and where it
engaged in the fishing and fish-processing aspects of the operation.
Hout Bay Fishing ran several ships that were used primarily to fish
for South Coast rock lobster. It also bought West Coast rock lobster
from a fleet of smaller local fishing vessels that operated around
Cape Town. After the West Coast and South Coast rock lobster was
10 Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 9–10; OCEAN AND LAND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT
CONSULTANTS, REVISION OF CALCULATIONS OF DAMAGES SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF
OVERCATCHES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOUTH COAST AND WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER
RESOURCES 38 (Table 6) (Dec. 22, 2004), ECF Nos. 195-13 & -14 [hereinafter OLRAC
REPORT].
11 J.C. Groeneveld, Under-Reporting of Catches of South Coast Rock Lobster
Palinurus Gilchristi, With Implications for the Assessment and Management of the Fishery,
25 AFRICAN J. MARINE SCIENCE 407 (May 2003) (attached to Gov’t Sentencing Mem., ECF
No. 195-28); Victim Statement of H.G.H. Kleinscmidt, Deputy Director General, Marine
and Coastal Management, at 2 (attached to Gov’t Sentencing Mem., ECF No. 195-28);
Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 16.
12 Declaration of Special Agent Jeffrey Ray ¶¶ 4g-i, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr.
308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004), ECF No. 195-15 [hereinafter Ray Decl.]; Gov’t
Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7–8; Government’s Recommendation Concerning Restitution
at 12, United States v. Bengis, No. 1:03-cr-00308-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004), ECF No.
195-12 [hereinafter Gov’t Restitution Recommendation].
13 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36–37; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 24–
25; Gov’t Restitution Recommendation at 6–8, 18–19; OLRAC REPORT, supra note 10,
Summary Chart.
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processed in Hout Bay Fishing’s factory, much of it was loaded into
shipping containers and exported to the United States and Asia.14
So how did the Bengis ring manage, for over a decade, to
overharvest such a massive quantity of illegal fish, land it on docks
in the middle of Cape Town harbor, process it in their Cape Town
factory, move it through South African customs, and export it to the
United States and Asia—all without being detected by South
African authorities? In fact, they did what any trafficker would do
if she was trying not to get caught. Worried that they might attract
attention if they offloaded the illegal fish during the day, they
offloaded it at night. Aware that authorities could pop up on the
docks to see them unload the illegal catch, they bribed fisheries
inspectors to look the other way. To keep up the façade that they
were a legitimate operation, they reported to the South African
fisheries authorities that they had, in fact, caught some fish. But
they significantly underreported their catch, which allowed them to
“stretch” the applicable catch quotas. And, to get the illegal fish out
of the country without getting caught, they submitted false export
documents to South African customs authorities, dramatically
underreporting the quantity of rock lobster they were exporting.15
B. The Demand Side
The demand side of the Bengis trafficking scheme was
centered in New York City, where the co-conspirators had an office,
and Portland, Maine, where they had a fish-processing factory.
Importing multiple containers of illegal fish into the United States
required the ring members to make a choice: what should they tell
the United States border authorities was in the containers? On the
one hand, they could have mislabeled the shipments, or told U.S.
Customs the same lies that they told the South Africans,
significantly underreporting the rock lobster in the containers. That
was a risky option, though, because the U.S. border officials could
always open a container, and then they would find that there was a
great deal more lobster in the container than the ring had declared in
the forms they submitted to U.S. Customs. The other option would
14

Indictment, supra note 9, at 14–15; Ray Decl., supra note 12 ¶¶ 4.e., 5.b., 5.f.;
Gov’t Restitution Recommendation at 12; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 5, 8.
15 Indictment, supra note 9, at 6–7, 14–18; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at
10–11, 37; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 5–6.
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be to tell the truth to U.S. Customs, accurately describing the
contents of the containers. But that option also involved some risk,
because then the declarations made to the United States during
import would be different from the declarations made in South
Africa during export. In the end, the co-conspirators elected to file
truthful declarations with U.S. Customs, apparently banking on the
idea that the U.S. and South African authorities would never
compare notes, and that the inconsistencies between the declarations
would go undetected.
C. The Money Flow
Of course, all of this overharvesting costs money. As
mentioned, as part of the scheme, the ring bought large quantities of
illegal West Coast rock lobster from local fishermen; these
fishermen needed to be paid. Hout Bay Fishing used its own boats
to harvest South Coast rock lobster; but the massive overharvesting
meant the traffickers had to pay more money for extra fuel, extra
time at sea, and extra wages to the crew. Processing fish at Hout
Bay Fishing’s factory also cost money, and processing all that extra
illegal fish meant extra processing expenses.
So how did the co-conspirators go about paying for their
scheme? The money due to the local South African fishermen and
crew was tied to the quantity of fish they caught. Paying them in
South Africa could pose a problem, because they were making way
too much money compared to the amount of fish that they reported
to the fisheries inspectors. The co-conspirators could solve that
problem, however, by paying the local fishermen and crew the extra
amounts in bank accounts in places outside of South Africa, such as
Switzerland or Spain.16 But what about all of the extra profits made
by selling illegal fish in the United States? Some of that money had
to go back to South Africa; Hout Bay Fishing was posing as a
legitimate operation, and South African authorities would expect
that it would be making at least some profit. But it would be a
rookie mistake to send all the money back to Cape Town, because
the South African authorities might have figured out that Hout Bay
Fishing was making too much money. There were plenty of ways to
handle the problem of too much money: they could keep the extra
16

Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 3, 13.
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money in U.S. banks or, better yet, send it to accounts in countries
such as Switzerland that were known to have strict bank secrecy
laws.17
The ring members had to keep track of what they had
represented to the South African authorities, to ensure both that the
numbers they declared kept within their allotted quotas, and that the
revenue they reported comported with the declared catch. But they
also had to keep track of the true amounts they had harvested, in
part because the wages they owed to the fishermen and to their own
crewmembers were based on the amount caught. 18 The ring
members kept themselves organized by using two sets of books.
One set—termed “Sheet A”—kept track of the legal fish: that is, the
amounts of fish that were within Hout Bay Fishing’s allotted catch
quotas and reported to the South African fisheries authorities. The
amounts actually harvested were reflected in a separate sheet,
“Sheet B,” which included the illegal fish that the ring had
harvested or purchased.19

III.

INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING A WILDLIFE
TRAFFICKING RING
A. How Do We Catch the Bad Guys?

So how do we go about investigating a wildlife trafficking
scheme, such as the Bengis scheme described above? When
conducting an investigation, it helps to put yourself in the shoes of
the bad guys, and imagine how you would execute the scheme. The
question to ask is simple: where does someone have to leave
evidence when conducting a trafficking scheme, and how do we go
about getting that evidence?
In the Bengis scheme, the ring members had to leave
evidence both in South Africa and in the United States. The most
straightforward evidence involved the conflicting representations
that the ring made to South African and U.S. authorities about the
quantity and type of fish in particular shipping containers. Under
international shipping protocols, each shipping container is assigned
17

Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 10; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 13–

18

Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19.
Ray Decl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 4.c., 4.j.; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 6–7.

14.
19
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a unique serial number. Those numbers are included on both the
export documents submitted when the container leaves South Africa
and the import documents submitted when the container enters the
United States. The co-conspirators presumably assumed that the
United States and South Africa never would sit down to compare
the two sets of documents. That was a mistake. By matching the
export documents with the import documents, investigators from
South Africa and the United States were able to demonstrate clearly
that the ring members were lying either to South Africa or to the
United States. Either way, the customs documents made it crystal
clear that a crime was in the works.
To execute the scheme, the ring had to leave other evidence
as well. In South Africa, for example, they had to keep records of
the wages they paid the crew. Because the crew’s pay was based on
the actual quantity of lobster caught, the payroll records necessarily
reflected the actual amounts of lobster harvested.20 The ring also
needed two separate sets of books in order to keep track of the
financial aspects of the scheme, so it was not surprising that the
investigation found the “Sheet A” and “Sheet B” documents during
their search of Hout Bay Fishing’s facility. And, of course, the ring
had to rely on the financial system to make the money transfers and
payments needed to support the scheme. Bank records in the United
States are easily available to federal prosecutors with a grand jury
subpoena, and a prosecutor with some effort and patience can get
bank records from other countries through a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT) request.21 Gathering all of these records,
and piecing together the money trail, provided clear evidence of the
money that the ring collected from selling the fish, and where they
sent the money afterwards.22
20

Gov’t Sentencing Bf., supra note 9, at 19.
For a helpful overview of how the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty process works,
see Virginia M. Kendall & T. Markus Funk, The Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
in Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 40 A.B.A. LITIG. J. 1, 3 (2014).
22 For a good summary of the United States’ efforts to follow the money trail see
Daniel W. Levy, Court Has Broad Authority Over Assets to Satisfy Restitution, LAW 360
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/646418/court-has-broad-authority-overassets-to-satisfy-restitution, archived at https://perma.cc/F36F-SQDP. See also Gov’t
Mem. Of Law in Support of Application for Writ Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) at 3–6,
United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014), ECF No. 219
(providing investigation results regarding how the Government identified significant assets
gathered, held and transferred by the ring among different bank accounts).
21
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Of course, conducting such a large poaching and trafficking
operation involves a large number of people, some of whom could
serve as possible witnesses, giving the investigators a peek into the
inner workings of the conspiracy. In the Bengis case, cooperating
witnesses in South Africa helped shed light on the inner workings of
the supply side of the scheme, 23 including how the ring was
involved for over a decade in overharvesting lobster far in excess of
applicable quotas, and how they tried to evade detection by
misreporting their catches to fisheries authorities, offloading illegal
fish at night, bribing fisheries officials, and “stretching” their
allotted quotas by falsely reporting their catch and shipments to the
fisheries authorities and to South African customs. Witnesses in the
United States, in turn, would be able to tell the investigators how
they went about importing and selling the illegal fish, and how the
ring handled the financial side of the scheme.
Co-conspirator witnesses are especially useful in
establishing mental state, often the most challenging aspect of
building a criminal case against an individual trafficking defendant.
Through witnesses, for example, the investigation was able to show
that one ring member had participated in altering documents to
conceal the actual quantity of South Coast rock lobster that Hout
Bay Fishing had harvested.24 Witnesses also reported that Arnold
Bengis, upon learning of the investigation, had ordered employees
to remove wage records from Hout Bay Fishing’s facility,
apparently concerned that, because crew wages were based on
actual catch, those records reflected the actual quantities of seafood
harvested.25 Witnesses helped establish that the ring arranged for
previously-disadvantaged South African citizens who did not have
valid U.S. working permits to work for low wages at the Maine
factory, where they were required to process illegal fish. 26 And
information from cooperating witnesses also helped establish mental
state through conversations the ring members had during the course
of the conspiracy. Perhaps the most dramatic conversation shedding
light on mental state concerned a reported conversation during
which Arnold Bengis’ lieutenants asked about the possibility of
being caught in the illegal trafficking scheme. According to the
23
24
25
26

Ray Decl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 3–5.; Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 7.
Indictment, supra note 9, at 26–27; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19.
Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 19.
Indictment, supra note 9, at 7, 20, 25; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 3.
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witnesses, Bengis responded that he likely would never be
prosecuted because he had “fuck you money.”27
B. The Prosecutions
South Africa’s prosecution naturally focused on the damage
the ring had inflicted in South Africa, targeting the poaching and
bribery aspects of the scheme. South Africa prosecuted the
operations manager for Hout Bay Fishing, a number of rock lobster
fishermen involved in poaching, and fourteen corrupt fisheries
inspectors. 28 South Africa also seized and forfeited Hout Bay’s
factory, a number of vessels, and a large quantity of illegal lobster.
Hout Bay Fishing entered a corporate plea of guilty, which required
it to pay a hefty fine.29
The U.S. prosecution also concentrated on the local impact,
but the focus was on the harm the ring had caused in the United
States. Of course, the most tangible harm the ring caused was the
poaching itself, which occurred over 7,000 miles away in Cape
Town. But the defendants, by bringing the illegal goods to the
United States, also harmed U.S. markets and consumers. By
dumping illegal fish onto the U.S. market, they undercut legitimate
competitors, hurt U.S. fishermen, passed off illegal lobster to
unwitting U.S. consumers, and threatened the future viability of a
previously healthy lobster supply.30
The U.S. prosecution was premised primarily on defendants’
violations of the Lacey Act,31 one of the oldest and certainly one of
the most powerful anti-trafficking tools around. 32 The anti27 Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 46, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK)
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gov’t Sentencing Bf., supra note 9, at 37.
28 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 4.
29 United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d at 36; Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at
22.
30 Gov’t Sentencing Mem., supra note 9, at 15–17 (outlining the harm to the U.S.
market, competitors and consumers); see also S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 12 (1969) (noting that,
“[b]y prohibiting the sale in the United States of wildlife protected by a foreign
government, the demand [in the U.S.] for poached wildlife from that country will be
sharply reduced”).
31
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2012).
32 Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight
Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36–52 (1995) (providing
an overview of the Lacey Act’s history and development).; see also Elinor Colbourn &
Thomas W. Swegle, The Lacey Act Amendments of 2008: Curbing International
Trafficking in Illegal Timber, STO36 ALI-ABA 365, 373–77 (Apr. 26, 2012)) (explaining
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trafficking provision of the Lacey Act, Section 3372(a)(2)(A),
focuses on protecting the integrity of the U.S. market, making it a
crime to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire or purchase”
wildlife, fish, plants and plant products that have been “taken,
possessed, transported, or sold . . . in violation of any foreign
law.”33 The gist of the Lacey Act is a two-step approach. The first
step—the “predicate law” inquiry—concerns the wildlife itself:
were the goods at issue “taken, possessed, transported, or sold” in
violation of some local (including foreign) law or regulation
intended to regulate fish, wildlife or plants? 34 The second step
focuses on the trade of those tainted goods in the United States,
making it illegal to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire
or purchase” illegal wildlife in the United States.35 The great power
of the anti-trafficking provision of the Lacey Act is that the Act
itself is largely agnostic about whether certain species may or may
not be harvested. Instead, the Act envisions that local states or
foreign countries will set the rules governing the conservation of the
wildlife, fish and plants in their own jurisdictions. But, once
wildlife, fish or plants have been “taken, possessed, transported, or
sold” illegally under local law, the Lacey Act says you cannot bring
those goods into the United States and trade them on U.S. markets.
So how was the Bengis prosecution able to establish the
“predicate law” violation—that the fish being brought into the
United States had been “taken, possessed, transported, or sold . . . in
violation of any foreign law”? Proving that one particular lobster
brought into the United States had been illegally harvested in South
African waters no doubt would have been difficult, if not impossible.
But, remember, the co-conspirators didn’t just overharvest; they
also tried to hide their poaching by offloading the illegal fish at
night when fisheries officials weren’t around, bribing fisheries
inspectors to look the other way, misreporting their catches to the
the importance and potency of the Lacey Act in the fight against widespread illegal
wildlife trafficking).
33 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2016).
34 The underlying predicate law violation may be, but need not be, a criminal law
violation. United States v. Lee, 937 F. 2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991). Rather, a violation of a
civil regulation may serve as a predicate for a Lacey Act prosecution, provided the law is
designed in part to protect wildlife, fish or plants.
35 See generally Robert S. Anderson & Mary Dee Carraway, Current Issues Arising in
Lacey Act Prosecutions, 63:3 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 3, 3–7 (2015) (summarizing the Lacey
Act’s anti-trafficking provisions).
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authorities, and lying on the export documents they submitted to the
South African customs officials. Of course, as mentioned, each of
these ploys required the ring to leave behind at least some evidence,
and that evidence proved crucial to the investigation. But these
deceptions also were central to the Lacey Act prosecution, because a
number of their evasive tricks themselves violated South African
law. So, while the ring members’ efforts to conceal the scheme was
a step away from the poaching itself, those efforts also
independently were violations of South African law, and formed
predicate law violations for the purposes of a Lacey Act
prosecution.36
That’s one of the beautiful things about the Lacey Act: to
execute their trafficking scheme without getting caught, the ring had
to violate a whole slew of South Africa’s reporting laws and export
regulations, a number of which were general laws governing trade.
While those laws and regulations all served a role in protecting
wildlife, fish and plants, they were not exclusively or specifically
targeted at prohibiting poaching. By violating those laws and
regulations, the co-conspirators provided the prosecution with a
number of the predicate law violations needed to support a
prosecution under the Lacey Act.
Five defendants were arrested in the U.S. case, and charged
with violations of the Lacey Act, smuggling and conspiracy. All
five pleaded guilty and ultimately were sentenced to terms of 46
months in jail for Arnold Bengis, 30 months in jail for Jeffrey Noll,
1 year in jail for David Bengis, and probation for the two defendants
who decided to cooperate with the U.S. prosecution. 37 The
defendants also were required to forfeit to the United States a total
of $7.4 million, which included $5.9 million forfeited by Arnold
Bengis and $1.5 million forfeited by David Bengis representing
proceeds of the sale of the Maine facility. 38 Finally, after many
years of litigation, the defendants were ordered to pay
approximately $22.4 million in restitution to South Africa, to
compensate the country for the harm they had caused.39

36
37
38
39

See Indictment, supra note 9, at 22–23, 29–39.
Docket Sheet, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Gov’t Appeal Bf., supra note 9, at 3–4.
United States v. Bengis, No. S1 03 Crim. 308 (LAK), (S.D.N.Y 2013).
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SOME TAKEAWAYS AND THOUGHTS FOR REFORM

So what are some of the strategies that we might use to
detect and hopefully disrupt an international wildlife trafficking
scheme? Some of the answers are obvious. We start by putting
ourselves in the shoes of the traffickers. To begin with, they are
well aware that poaching is illegal. They also know that regulators
are tasked with trying to prevent trade of illegal goods by inspecting
goods at commercial gateways, such as ports or border crossings,
and by requiring traders to declare the goods they are exporting and
importing. So, to engage in a trafficking scheme, the criminals need
to poach in places where their activities are hard to detect or in
situations where either no one will enforce the laws or the penalties
are so light that the occasional slap on the wrist will not
significantly impact their business. They also need to figure out
ways to circumvent the various regulations governments have put in
place to police the international trade routes. And they will need to
move money around, both to fund their ongoing scheme and to
conceal their illegal profits.
The trafficker’s tactic is to look for, and exploit, gaps in the
regulatory apparatus. Worried about the game warden? Have your
people poach where and when she is not around or, if necessary,
bribe her to look the other way. Concerned about the harbormaster
or the borders? Learn about how the authorities actually work, and
figure out ways to circumvent their controls, perhaps by mislabeling
and disguising the cargo, and by misreporting the true contents in
any declaration you submit to the authorities. Unless the customs
officials from the exporting country routinely exchange information
about particular shipments with their counterparts in the importing
country, you might decide it makes sense to tell each country
something different about the goods you’ve packed in a particular
container. Finally, you need to understand how the banking system
works, and look for ways to move money around without anyone
figuring out that you got the money illegally and are funding a
wildlife trafficking ring.
How do we stop them? The traffickers don’t hate animals;
they’re in the illegal wildlife trade because they want to make
money, and they have calculated that the rewards outweigh the risks.
The key to stopping wildlife traffickers is to change the risk
equation. The various efforts by countries and NGOs to dampen
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demand40 hopefully will go a long way toward lowering the reward
side of the equation. And law enforcement, by becoming better at
catching the traffickers, making sure they get stiffer penalties, and
taking away any ill-gotten gains, will help increase the risk, thus
pushing the bad guys out of the wildlife trafficking business.
Much of the required framework already is in place, but
enforcement sometimes suffers because of anemic execution. The
first step on the enforcement side is to detect the crime and catch the
bad guys. The fight against poaching itself presents a tough
problem to crack, at least right now, in part because much of the
poaching occurs in poorer developing countries, where enforcement
is lax and corruption is pervasive. To help stop poaching in the
range (or source) countries or on the high seas, it no doubt would
help to have more and better equipped wildlife and fisheries
enforcement officials, and it also would help if poachers faced
serious penalties if they got caught. Local corruption will undercut
all of these efforts, however, both because the traffickers can pay off
the game wardens or fisheries officials, and because they can pay
off prosecutors or judges if they do end up getting caught.
Much of the solution to such pervasive corruption in
developing countries boils down to ongoing efforts by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and others to build a “rule of law” culture throughout the world.
The Fraud Section of the U.S. Department of Justice could play a
more constructive role in this area by concentrating some of their
robust efforts to enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 41 on
international environmental crimes.42 The press and NGOs also can
play a role by directing their bright lights and publicity machines
more closely on individual arrests and prosecutions in poaching and
low-level trafficking cases, both to make it more difficult for
defendants to buy their way out of an arrest by bribing a local

40

See AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3.
42
See Marcus Asner, Samuel Witten & Jacklyn DeMar, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Overseas Environmental Crimes: How Did We Get Here and What
Happens Next? BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY ENV’T REP. (July 12, 2012), http://www.
bna.com/overseas-environmental-crimes (discussing the connections between corruption
and foreign environmental crimes and advocating for stricter international regulation of
natural resources).
41
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prosecutor or court official, and to publicize successful enforcement
efforts.
How do we go about detecting trafficking once the illegal
goods have entered international trade channels? A first big step
would be to make sure people declare clearly and precisely what
goods they are shipping. Allowing traffickers to fall back on
general terms—such as “frozen fish” or “fresh meat” or “wood”—
provides them with a good opportunity to avoid detection. Opening
and inspecting more containers, and making sure that customs and
other border inspectors learn enough about the wildlife trade so they
know what to look for, is another way to help catch and deter
trafficking. Adopting a uniform computerized system to enable
customs officials in an exporting country to exchange export
documentation seamlessly with customs officials in the importing
country would help ensure that traffickers would not be able to
conceal the scheme by telling different things to different countries
about what they packed into a particular container.
Once a trafficking scheme is detected, how do we go about
using criminal law to punish the traffickers, deter others, and
compensate the victim countries? In the United States, we are
helped by having robust criminal enforcement statutes, such as the
Lacey Act. Other countries should follow suit, both by adopting
Lacey Act-style laws and by shoring up their existing laws to make
wildlife trafficking a serious criminal offense. 43 Ensuring that
judges and prosecutors treat wildlife trafficking as a serious crime,
on par with other financial crimes such as fraud or theft, has the
immediate and obvious benefit of helping ensure that the traffickers
are punished for their crimes. But there are collateral benefits as
well. The prospect of a lengthy prison sentence and hefty fines also
can deter others from entering the wildlife trafficking business in
the first place. An added bonus is that the fear of a heavy penalty
can prove crucial to the investigation itself as well—particularly if a
country’s legal system has a well-developed witness cooperation
framework 44 —because it gives a defendant a strong incentive to
43
See UNODC/WWF FISHERIES CRIME EXPERT GROUP MEETING, WWF MEETING
REP. 11 (2016) (recommending that “states should adopt US Lacey-Act type legislation”).
44 The United States federal system has a robust system for encouraging defendants in
federal criminal cases to cooperate with investigations and prosecutions. Section 5K1.1 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines allows for judges to depart from the otherwise
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range “[u]pon motion of the government stating that the
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cooperate with the investigation and prosecution. This cooperation
often is a key factor both in identifying all players in a trafficking
ring and in establishing that individual members had the requisite
mental state to make them guilty of a crime.
While the U.S. criminal statutes are comparatively strong,
the United States also could take steps to enhance its laws. One
change that would help would be for Congress to pass a bill
proposed by the President’s Advisory Council on Wildlife
Trafficking to modify federal criminal law so that wildlife
trafficking violations, especially felony violations of the Lacey Act,
would serve as predicate violations under (i) the Travel Act,45 (ii)
the federal money laundering statutes, 46 and (iii) the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).47 As
the Council explained in a public letter to Senators Lindsey Graham
and Dianne Feinstein:
The [proposed] modifications would provide federal
law enforcement with additional tools in the fight
against wildlife trafficking, both by expanding the
reach of federal law enforcement jurisdiction in this
area, and by increasing possible penalties. The
legislation also would send an important message,
because it would signal that the United States
considers wildlife trafficking a serious crime, in the
same general band as a wide range of other federal
crimes, ranging from wire fraud to Interstate
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense.”
45 Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2016).
46 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2016).
47 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2016); Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking Recommendations to Presidential
Task Force on Combatting Wildlife Trafficking 3 (June 9, 2014), https://www.
fws.gov/international/advisory-council-wildlife-trafficking/pdf/advisory-councilrecommendations-06-09-14.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/C6JR-NEVF [hereinafter
Advisory Council Recommendations]. The Department of Justice recently proposed
amending the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, to include as a predicate act
(“specified unlawful activity”) “any act or activity constituting an offense in violation of
the laws of the United States punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 114th Cong., at 2
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/849986/download, archived at https://perma.cc/
TLG2-RXR3. The DOJ proposal as a practical matter is far more sweeping than the
Advisory Council’s more modest proposed change to the money laundering statute.
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Transportation of Stolen Property to narcotics
trafficking, and set an example that will influence
other countries to do the same. The United States
has supported efforts through United Nations
agencies (such as the United Nations Organizations
on Drugs and Organized Crime) and other fora to
have wildlife trafficking recognized as serious crime,
and we believe that legislation here in the U.S.
should reflect this.48
Finally, one powerful way to change the trafficker’s
risk/reward equation is to reduce the trafficker’s expected reward by
taking away his illegal profits. A trafficker expecting to make a few
million dollars in a trafficking scheme, and facing a small chance of
spending a few years in jail, may decide that wildlife trafficking is
worth the risk, especially if he can expect to end up with the money
after he gets out of jail. Taking away the illegal profits changes the
equation.
Forfeiting the proceeds of wildlife trafficking to the
government can be a powerful tool in ensuring that traffickers are
denied the fruits of their crime. But making the traffickers pay
restitution to their victims can be even more powerful in appropriate
cases. Following the Second Circuit’s restitution decision in
Bengis,49 prosecutors often are able to rely on the federal restitution
statutes, Sections 3663 and 3663A of Title 18 of the United States
Code, to obtain restitution for victims of wildlife crime. 50 The
Bengis decision is limited, however, because it bases restitution on
violations of general criminal statutes, such as smuggling or
conspiracy, and not on violations of statutes that are specifically
directed at wildlife trafficking, such as the Lacey Act. This means
that, in some cases, serious wildlife criminals may be able to avoid
48

Letter from Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking to Senators Graham and
Feinstein 2 (June 9, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/international/advisory-council-wildlifetrafficking/pdf/federal-advisory-council-letter-06-09-14.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
K7U6-SWNW [hereinafter Advisory Council Letter].
49
631 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2011).
50 See United States v. Bruce, 437 F. App’x 357 (6th Cir. 2011) (ordering restitution
to the States of Tennessee and Alabama); United States v. Oceanpro Indus., Ltd., 674 F.3d
323, 332 (4th Cir. 2012) (ordering restitution to Maryland and Virginia); see generally
Melanie Pierson & Meghan N. Dilges, Restitution in Wildlife Cases, 63 U.S. ATT’YS BULL.,
no. 3, 82, 86–87 (2015) (summarizing recent restitution cases in wildlife cases).
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having to pay restitution to their victims. It also signals that the
United States considers wildlife trafficking to be a less serious
crime. A simple remedy would be to modify the federal restitution
statutes to include wildlife crime statutes, particularly the Lacey
Act.51
To be sure, there may be situations in which awarding
restitution to a victim country would not be appropriate. In some
cases, for example, there is no clear victim or local corruption
makes it unclear where the restitution payments would end up. But
making sure appropriate victims get compensation in wildlife
cases—whether the victims are individual landowners, states or
countries—serves an important role in the fight against wildlife
trafficking. Ensuring that innocent victims receive compensation
reflects the reality that wildlife has a real, economic value to local
communities. Affording victims their right to restitution also will
give them a power incentive to work with U.S. law enforcement in
the fight against trafficking.

V.

CONCLUSION

Illegal wildlife trafficking has evolved into a big business in
recent years, and the organized criminal rings that trade in wildlife,
seafood and timber have grown ever more professional and
sophisticated. Their methods of moving their illegal product
through the borders and other gateways of commerce increasingly
resemble the approaches we usually associate with narcotics
trafficking or other sorts of smuggling. This Article argues that the
key to catching the traffickers in large part boils down to
understanding better how they go about moving their illegal goods,
what sorts of things they have to do to evade detection, and how
they move around money both to support the scheme and to launder
their illegal profits. Once we better understand how the traffickers
must operate, we’ll be in a much better position to know where they
leave evidence behind for us to find.
Learning how traffickers operate and where they will leave
evidence certainly will help in the effort to catch them and break up
51 See Advisory Council Recommendations, supra note 47, at 3 (recommending three
strategic priorities set forth in the National Strategy); Advisory Council Letter, supra note
48, at 2–3 (supporting proposed legislation against wildlife trafficking).
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their organizations. But that knowledge also will help legislators
enact laws that will better arm law enforcement in the fight against
wildlife trafficking. Understanding, for example, that a trafficking
ring likely will need to violate multiple local trade laws and
regulations before it ships poached goods to sell in another country
provides a strong argument for Lacey Act-style legislation. If all
countries adopted a version of the Lacey Act, for example, demand
countries would be in a better position to combat the illegal wildlife
trade in their own markets, which in turn will help dry up the market
and ultimately help bolster the efforts of the source countries to stop
local poaching.
While the Lacey Act gives United States law enforcement a
leg up in the fight against wildlife trafficking, the United States also
could improve its legal framework. As we saw in Bengis,
trafficking rings can be complex, organized enterprises that
establish elaborate money laundering operations to further their
schemes. U.S. law enforcement often relies on powerful statutes
such as RICO or the anti-money laundering laws to break up
sophisticated criminal organizations. If we are serious about
fighting wildlife trafficking, Congress should amend the law to
make wildlife trafficking a predicate crime under the RICO, money
laundering and Travel Act statutes.
Bolstering the federal
restitution statutes to include wildlife trafficking also would help in
the fight against trafficking, in part because it would give law
enforcement another tool to ensure that traffickers don’t get to keep
the proceeds of their illegal scheme. Perhaps more fundamentally,
however, bolstering the restitution statutes will help ensure that
victim communities receive appropriate compensation for the harm
that the traffickers inflicted. Awarding compensation to local
communities will contribute to the ongoing fight against trafficking
because it will incentivize them both to value and better protect their
own wildlife, and to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement in
international wildlife trafficking investigations.
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